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Abstract 
Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important 
cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes 
optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior 
preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active 
inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected 
(variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a 
recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs 
about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states 
of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs 
about “what would happen if I did that” to “what would I believe about what would happen if I did 
that”. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over 
actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed 
to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep 
decision problems. 
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Introduction 
In theoretical neurobiology, active inference has proved useful in providing a generic account 
of motivated behaviour under ideal Bayesian assumptions, incorporating both epistemic and 
pragmatic value (Da Costa et al., 2020a; Friston et al., 2017a). This account is often portrayed 
as being based on first principles, because it inherits from the statistical physics of random 
dynamical systems at nonequilibrium steady-state (Friston, 2013; Hesp et al., 2019a; Parr et 
al., 2020). Active inference does not pretend to replace existing formulations of sentient 
behaviour – it just provides a Bayesian mechanics from which most (and, arguably, all) 
normative optimisation schemes can be derived as special cases. Generally, these special cases 
arise when ignoring one sort of uncertainty or another. For example, if we ignore uncertainty 
about (unobservable) hidden states that generate (observable) outcomes, active inference 
reduces to conventional schemes like optimal control theory and reinforcement learning. While 
the latter schemes tend to focus on the maximisation of value as a function of hidden states per 
se, active inference optimises a functional1 of (Bayesian) beliefs about hidden states. This 
allows it to account for uncertainties surrounding action and perception in a unified, Bayes-
optimal fashion.  
Most current applications of active inference rest on the selection of policies (i.e., ordered 
sequences of actions; or open-loop policies, where the sequence of future actions depends only 
on current states but not future states) that minimise a functional of beliefs called expected free 
energy (Da Costa et al., 2020a; Friston et al., 2017a). This approach clearly has limitations, in 
the sense that one has to specify a priori allowable policies, each of which represents a possible 
path through a deep tree of action sequences. This formulation limits the scalability of the 
ensuing schemes, because only a relatively small number of policies can be evaluated 
(Tschantz et al., 2019). In this paper, we consider active inference schemes that enable a deep 
tree search over all allowable sequences of action into the future. Because this involves a 
 
1 Technically, a ‘functional’ is defined as a function whose arguments (in this case, beliefs about hidden states) 
are themselves functions of other arguments (in this case, observed outcomes generated by hidden states). 
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recursive evaluation of expected free energy – and implicit Bayesian beliefs – the resulting 
scheme has a sophisticated aspect (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Devaine et al., 2014); namely, 
rolling out beliefs about beliefs. 
‘Sophistication’ is a term from the economics literature and refers to having beliefs about one’s 
own or another’s beliefs. For instance, in game theory, an agent is said to have a level of 
sophistication of one if she has beliefs about her opponent; two if she has beliefs about her 
opponent’s beliefs about her strategy; and so forth. Most people have a level of sophistication 
greater than two (Camerer et al., 2004). 
On this view, most current illustrations of active inference can be regarded as unsophisticated 
or naive, in the sense that they only consider beliefs about the consequences of action, as 
opposed to the consequences of action for beliefs. In what follows, we try to unpack this 
distinction intuitively and formally, using mathematical and numerical analyses. We also take 
the opportunity to survey the repertoire of existing schemes that fall under the Bayesian 
mechanics of active inference; including, expected utility theory (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944), Bayesian decision theory (Berger, 2011), optimal Bayesian design 
(Lindley, 1956), reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1981), active learning (MacKay, 
1992), risk sensitive control (van den Broek et al., 2010), artificial curiosity (Schmidhuber, 
2006), intrinsic motivation (Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007), empowerment (Klyubin et al., 2005), 
and the information bottleneck method (Tishby et al., 1999; Tishby and Polani, 2010). 
Sophisticated inference recovers Bayes-adaptive reinforcement learning (Åström, 1965; 
Ghavamzadeh et al., 2016; Ross et al., 2008) in the zero temperature limit. Both approaches 
perform belief state planning, where the agent maximizes an objective function by taking into 
account how it expects its own beliefs to change in the future (Duff, 2002), and evinces a degree 
of sophistication. The key distinction is that Bayes-adaptive reinforcement learning considers 
arbitrary reward functions, while sophisticated active inference optimises an expected free 
energy that can be motivated from first principles. While both can be specified for particular 
tasks, the expected free energy additionally mandates the agent to seek out information about 
the world (Friston, 2013; Friston, 2019) beyond what is necessary for solving a particular task 
(Tishby and Polani, 2010). This allows inference to account for artificial curiosity (Lindley, 
1956; Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007; Schmidhuber, 1991), that goes beyond reward seeking to the 
gathering of evidence for an agent's existence (i.e., its marginal likelihood). This is sometimes 
referred to as self-evidencing (Hohwy, 2016). 
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The basic distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated inference was briefly 
introduced in Appendix 6 of (Friston et al., 2017a). This distinction is subtle but can lead to 
fundamentally different kinds of behaviour. We will use a simple example to illustrate the 
difference: consider the following three-armed bandit problem – with a twist. The right and left 
arms increase or decrease your winnings. However, you do not know which arm is which. The 
central arm does not affect your winnings but tells you which arm pays off. Crucially, once you 
have committed to either the right or the left arm, you cannot switch to the other arm. This 
game is engineered to confound agents who choice behaviour is based upon Bayesian decision 
theory. This follows because the expected payoff is the same for every sequence of moves. In 
other words, choosing the right or left arm – for the first and subsequent trials – means you are 
equally likely to win or lose. Similarly, choosing the middle arm (or indeed doing nothing) has 
the same Bayesian risk or expected utility.  
However, an active inference agent – who is trying to minimise her expected free energy2 – 
will select actions that minimise the risk of losing and resolve her uncertainty about whether 
the right or left arm pays off. This means that the centre arm acquires epistemic (uncertainty-
resolving) affordance and becomes intrinsically attractive. On choosing the central arm – and 
discovering which arm holds the reward – her subsequent choices are informed, in the sense 
that she can exploit her knowledge and commit to the rewarding arm. In this example, the agent 
has resolved a simple exploration-exploitation dilemma3, by resolving ambiguity as a prelude 
to exploiting updated beliefs about the consequences of subsequent action. Note that having 
selected the central arm there is no ambiguity in play and its epistemic affordance disappears. 
Note further that, initially, all three arms have some epistemic affordance; however, the right 
and left arms are less informative if the payoff is probabilistic.  
 
2 Expected free energy can be read as risk plus ambiguity: risk is taken here to be the relative entropy (i.e., KL 
divergence) between predicted and preferred outcomes, while ambiguity is the conditional entropy (i.e., 
conditional uncertainty) about outcomes given their causes. 
3 Exploration here has been associated with the resolution of ambiguity or uncertainty about hidden states; namely, 
the context in which the agent is operating (i.e., left, or right arm payoff). More conventional formulations of 
exploration could remove the prior belief that the right and left arms have a complementary payoff structure, such 
that the agent has to learn the probabilities of winning and losing, when selecting either arm. However, exactly 
the same principles apply: the right and left arms now acquire an epistemic affordance in virtue of resolving 
uncertainty about the contingencies that underlie payoffs – as opposed to hidden states. We will see how this falls 
out of expected free energy minimisation later. 
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The key move behind this paper is to consider a sophisticated agent who evaluates the expected 
free energy of each move recursively. Simply choosing the central arm to resolve uncertainty 
does not, in and of itself, mean an epistemic action was chosen in the service of securing future 
rewards. In other words, the central arm is selected because all the options had the same 
Bayesian risk4; while the central arm had the greatest epistemic affordance5. Now consider a 
sophisticated agent, who imagines what she will do after acting. For each plausible outcome, 
she can work out how her beliefs about hidden states will be updated – and evaluate the 
expected free energy of the subsequent move, under each action and subsequent outcome. By 
taking the average over both, she can evaluate the expected free energy of the second move 
that is afforded by the first. If she repeats this process recursively, she can, effectively, perform 
a deep tree search over all ordered sequences of actions and their consequences.  
Heuristically, the unsophisticated agent simply chooses the central arm because he knows it 
will resolve uncertainty about states of affairs. Conversely, the sophisticated agent follows 
through – on this resolution of ambiguity – in terms of its implications for subsequent choices. 
In this instance, she knows that only two things can happen if she chooses the central arm; 
either the right or left arm will be disclosed as the payoff arm. In either case, the subsequent 
choice can be made unambiguously to minimise risk and secure her reward. The average 
expected free energy of these subsequent actions will be pleasingly low, making a choice of 
the central arm more attractive than its expected free energy would otherwise suggest. This 
means the sophisticated agent is more confident about her choices because she has gone beyond 
forming beliefs about the consequences of action to consider the effects of action on subsequent 
beliefs and the (epistemic) actions that ensue. The remainder of this paper unpacks this 
recursive kind of planning, using formal analysis and simulations. 
This paper comprises three sections. The first provides a brief overview of active inference in 
terms of free energy minimisation and the various schemes that can be used for implementation. 
This section starts with the basic imperative to optimise Bayesian beliefs about latent or hidden 
states of the world in terms of approximate Bayesian (i.e., variational) inference (Dayan et al., 
1995). It then goes on to cast planning as inference (Attias, 2003; Botvinick and Toussaint, 
 
4 Bayesian risk is taken to be negative expected utility, i.e., expected loss under some predictive posterior beliefs 
(about hidden states).   
5 Epistemic affordance is taken to be the information gain or relative entropy of predictive beliefs (about hidden 
states), before and after an action. 
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2012) as the minimisation of an expected free energy under allowable sequences of actions or 
policies (Friston et al., 2017a). The foundations of expected free energy are detailed in an 
appendix from two complementary perspectives, the second of which is probably more 
fundamental as it rests upon the first-principle account mentioned above (Friston, 2013; 
Friston, 2019; Parr et al., 2020). The second section considers sophisticated schemes using a 
recursive formulation of expected free energy. Effectively, this enables the efficient search of 
deep policy trees (that entail all possible outcomes under each policy or path). This search is 
efficient because only those paths that have a sufficiently high predictive posterior probability 
need to be evaluated. This restricted tree search is straightforward to implement in the present 
setting because we are propagating beliefs (i.e., probabilities) – as opposed to value functions. 
The third section provides some illustrative simulations that compare sophisticated and 
unsophisticated agents in the three-armed bandit (or T-maze paradigm) described above. This 
final section considers deeper problems, using navigation and novelty seeking as an example. 
We conclude with a brief summary of what sophisticated inference brings to the table. 
 
Active inference and free energy minimisation 
Most of the active inference literature concerns itself with partially observable Markov decision 
processes. In other words, it considers generative models of discrete hidden states and 
observable outcomes, with uncertainty about the (likelihood) mapping between hidden states 
and outcomes – and (prior) probability transitions among hidden states. Crucially, sequential 
policy selection is cast as an inference problem, by treating sequences of actions (i.e., policies) 
as random variables. Planning then simply entails optimising posterior beliefs about the 
policies being pursued – and selecting an action from the most likely policy.  
On this view, there are just two sets of unknown variables: namely, hidden states and policies. 
Belief distributions over this bipartition can then be optimised with respect to an evidence 
bound in the usual way, using an appropriate mean-field approximation (Beal, 2003; Winn and 
Bishop, 2005). In this setup, we can associate perception with the optimisation of posterior 
beliefs about hidden states, while action follows from planning based upon posterior beliefs 
about policies. Implicit in this formulation is a generative model; namely, a probabilistic 
specification of the joint probability distribution over policies, hidden states, and outcomes. 
This generative model is usually factorised into the likelihood of outcomes, given hidden states, 
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the conditional distribution over hidden states, given policies, and prior over policies. In active 
inference, the priors over policies is determined by their expected free energy, noting that the 
expected free energy, which depends upon future courses of action, furnishes an empirical prior 
over subsequent actions. 
In brief, given some prior beliefs about the initial and final states of some epoch of active 
inference, the game is to find a posterior belief distribution over policies that brings the initial 
distribution as close as possible to the final distribution, given observations. This objective can 
be achieved by optimising posterior beliefs about hidden states and policies with respect to a 
variational bound on (the logarithm of) the marginal likelihood of the generative model (i.e., 
log evidence). This evidence bound is known as a variational free energy, or (negative) 
evidence lower bound. In what follows, we overview the formal aspects of this enactive kind 
of inference. 
 
Discrete state-space models 
Our objective is to optimise beliefs (i.e., an approximate posterior) over policies   and their 
consequences; namely, hidden states s s   from some initial state 1s , until some policy 
horizon τ, given some observations 
to  up until the current time t. This optimisation can be cast 
as minimising a (generalised) free energy functional [ ( , )]F Q s   of the approximate posterior 
(Parr and Friston, 2019b). This generalised free energy has two parts: the first entails a 
generative model for state transitions, given policies, while the second entails a generative 
model for policies that depend upon the final states (omitting constants for clarity):  
( )
( )
( )
( | )
( , | )
[ ( , )] [ ( )] [ ( ) || ( )]
[ln ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
( ) [ln ( | ) ln ( , | )]
( ) [ln ( | ) ln ( , )]
, | ( | ) ( | )
ln ( ) ( ) ( )
Q KL
Q
Q s t
Q o s
F Q s F D Q P
Q E F G
F Q s P o s
G Q s P o s
Q o s P o s Q s
P E G

 


  
   
    
   
   
  
 
 
  
   
= +
= + + +
= −
= −
=
− = +
    (1.1)  
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This generalised free energy includes the variational free energy of each policy ( )F   that 
depends on priors over state transitions – and an expected free energy of each policy ( )G   that 
underwrites priors over policies. The priors over policies ln ( ) ( ) ( )P E G  = − −  ensure the 
expected free energy at time   (i.e., the policy horizon) is minimised. Here, ( )E   represents 
an empirical prior that is usually conditioned upon hidden states at a higher level in deep (i.e., 
hierarchical) generative models. Note that outcomes on the horizon are random variables with 
a likelihood distribution, whereas outcomes in the past are realised variables.  
The first equality above shows that the variational free energy, expected under the posterior 
over policies, plays the role of an accuracy, while the complexity of posterior beliefs about 
policies is the divergence from prior beliefs6. In other words, variational free energy scores the 
evidence for a particular policy that accrues from observed outcomes. The priors over policies 
also have the form of a free energy. For interested readers, the appendix provides a fairly 
comprehensive motivation of this functional form, from complementary perspectives. We now 
consider the role of free energy in exact, approximate, and amortized inference – before turning 
to active inference and policy selection. 
Perception as inference 
Optimising the posterior over hidden states renders the variational free energy equivalent to 
(negative) log evidence – or marginal likelihood – in the usual way, while optimising the 
posterior over policies renders the generalised free energy zero: 
( )| arg min ( ) ( | , )
( ) ln ( | )
( ) arg min [ ( , )]
[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
[ ( , )] 0
Q t
t
Q
Q s F P s o
F P o
Q F Q s
E F G
F Q s
  
 
 
   

 

= =
 = −
=
= − − −
 =
      (1.2) 
The first equalities correspond to exact Bayesian inference based on a softmax function – i.e., 
normalised exponential, [·] – of the log probability over outcomes and hidden states, under a 
particular policy. To finesse the numerics of optimising the posterior over all hidden states, a 
 
6 Generally speaking, log evidence is accuracy minus complexity, where accuracy is the expected log likelihood 
and complexity is the KL divergence between posterior and prior beliefs. 
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mean-field approximation usually leverages the Markovian form of the generative model to 
optimise an approximate posterior over hidden states at each time point (where 
\s  denotes the 
Markov blanket of s ): 
( )
( )
( )
\
\
( | )
( | ) 1 1
1 2
1 2 1 1
| [ [ln ( , | )]]
[ [ln ( | ) ln ( | , ) ln ( | , )]]
| ( | ) ( | ) ( | )
| ( | ) ( | , ) ( | , )
Q s t
Q s
Q s P o s
P o s P s s P s s
Q s Q s Q s Q s
P s P s P s s P s s


  
      

 
  
  
   
   
 
− +
−
=
= + +
=
=
  (1.3) 
This corresponds to a form of approximate Bayesian inference (i.e., variational Bayes) in which 
(1.3) is iterated over the factors of the mean-field approximation, to perform a coordinate 
descent or fixed-point iteration (Beal, 2003). An alternative formulation rests on an explicit 
minimisation of variational free energy using iterated gradient flows to each fixed point 
(expressed in terms of sufficient statistics): 
( )
\( | )
( ) [ln ( , | )] ln ( | )
( )
| ( )
Q s tF P o s Q s
Q s Cat

 

   
 
 

 
  


 = − = −
=
=
s
v
s v
s
   (1.4) 
This solution can be read as (neuronal) dynamics that implement variational message passing7  
(Beal, 2003; Friston et al., 2017c; Parr et al., 2019). In this form, the free energy gradients 
constitute a prediction error; namely, the difference between the posterior surprisal8 and its 
predicted value. 
Finally, one can consider amortizing inference using standard procedures from machine 
learning to optimise the parameters   of a recognition model w.r.t. variational free energy. In 
the present setting, this approach can be summarised as using universal function approximators 
 
7 Where v can be thought of as transmembrane voltage or depolarisation and s corresponds to the average firing 
rate of a neuronal population. Da Costa, L., Parr, T., Sengupta, B., Friston, K., 2020b. Natural selection finds 
natural gradient. arXiv arXiv:2001.08028. 
8 Surprisal is the self-information or negative log probability of outcomes. Tribus, M., 1961. Thermodynamics 
and Thermostatics: An Introduction to Energy, Information and States of Matter, with Engineering Applications. 
D. Van Nostrand Company Inc, New York, USA. 
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(e.g., deep neural networks) to parameterise (1.2); namely, the mapping between observations 
and the sufficient statistics of the approximate posterior. For example, 
( )
( , , )
arg min [ ( , )]
( )
tf o
F Q s
Q s Cat f
 
  

 

 

 =
=
=
s s
       (1.5) 
Effectively, amortized inference is ‘learning to infer’ (Catal et al., 2019; Lee and Keramati, 
2017; Millidge, 2019; Toussaint and Storkey, 2006; Tschantz et al., 2019; Ueltzhöffer, 2018). 
Variational autoencoders can be regarded as an instance of amortized inference, if we ignore 
conditioning on policies: e.g., (Suh et al., 2016). Clearly, amortization precludes online 
inference and, as such, may appear biologically implausible. However, it might be the case that 
certain brain structures learn to infer: e.g., the cerebellum might learn from inferential 
processes implemented by the cerebral cortex (Doya, 1999; Ramnani, 2014). 
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Planning as inference 
The posterior over policies is somewhat simpler to evaluate – as a softmax function of their 
empirical 9 , variational and expected free energy. This can be expressed in terms of a 
generalised free energy that includes the parameters of the generative model (e.g., the 
likelihood parameters, A): 
( , | ) ( )
( ) arg min [ ( , , )] [ ( ) ( ) G( )]
G( ) [ln ( | ) ( ) ln ( , , )]
Q
Q o s Q A
Q F Q s A E F
Q s Q A P o s A
     
     
 
= = − − −
= −
     (1.6) 
The expected free energy of a policy can be unpacked in a number of ways. Perhaps the most 
intuitive is in terms of risk and ambiguity10: 
R
( ,
isk Ambi
)
guit
|
y
G( ) [ ( , | ) || ( , )] [ ln ( | , )]Q sKL oD Q s A P s A P o s A     = + −    (1.7) 
This means that policy selection minimises risk and ambiguity. Risk, in this setting, is simply 
the difference between predicted and prior beliefs about final states. In other words, policies 
will be deemed more likely if they bring about states that conform to prior preferences. In the 
optimal control literature, this part of expected free energy underwrites KL control (Todorov, 
2008; van den Broek et al., 2010). In economics, it leads to risk sensitive policies (Fleming and 
Sheu, 2002). Ambiguity reflects the uncertainty about future outcomes, given hidden states. 
Minimising ambiguity therefore corresponds to choosing future states that generate 
unambiguous and informative outcomes (e.g., switching on a light in the dark). 
Sometimes, it is useful to express risk in terms of outcomes, as opposed to hidden states. For 
example, when the generative model is unknown – or one can only quantify preferences about 
outcomes (as opposed to the inferred causes of those outcomes). In these cases, the risk over 
hidden states can be replaced risk over outcomes, by assuming the divergence between the 
predicted and true posterior is small (omitting parameters for clarity): 
 
9 The empirical free energy is usually based upon inferences at a higher level in a hierarchical generative model. 
For details on hierarchical generative models, please see Friston, K.J., Rosch, R., Parr, T., Price, C., Bowman, H., 
2017d. Deep temporal models and active inference. Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews 77, 388-402. 
10 The appendix provides derivations of (1.7) based upon the principles of optimal Bayesian design and an integral 
fluctuation theorem described in Friston, K., 2019. A free energy principle for a particular physics, eprint 
arXiv:1906.10184.. 
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Risk (states) Risk (outcomes) Expected evidenc n
( | )
e bou d
[ ( | ) || ( )] [ ( | ) || ( )] [ [ ( | , ) || ( | )]KL KL Q o KLD Q s P s D Q o P o D Q s o P s o         = +       (1.8) 
This divergence constitutes an expected evidence bound that also appears if we unpack 
expected free energy in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic value11: 
( )
Extrinsic value Expected evidence bound
( )
Intrinsic value (states) or salie
( | ) |
|
nce
G( ) [ln ( )] [ [ ( , | , ) || ( , | )]]
 [ [ ( | , ) || ( | )]]
Q o KL
Q o KL
Q o P o D Q s A o P s A o
D Q s o Q s
 

  
  
   

 
 
= − +
− ,
Intrinsic value (parameters) or novelty
( | ) ( | )
( | )[ [ ( | , , ) || ( )]]
[ln ( )] [ [ ( , | , ) || ( , | )]]Q o Q o KL
Expected log evi
Q o
de
s
nce Expect  
KL
ed
D Q A o s Q A
P o D Q s A o Q s A
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
−
 − −
information gain
   (1.9) 
Extrinsic value is just the expected value of log prior preferences (i.e., log evidence), which 
can be associated with reward and utility in behavioural psychology and economics, 
respectively (Barto et al., 2013; Kauder, 1953; Schmidhuber, 2010). In this setting, extrinsic 
value is the complement of Bayesian risk (Berger, 2011). The intrinsic value of a policy is its 
epistemic value or affordance (Friston et al., 2015). This is just the expected information gain 
afforded by a particular policy, which can be about hidden states (i.e., salience) or model 
parameters (i.e., novelty). It is this term that underwrites artificial curiosity (Schmidhuber, 
2006). The final inequality above shows that extrinsic value is the expected log evidence under 
beliefs about final outcomes, while the intrinsic value ensures that this expectation is 
maximally informed, when outcomes are encountered. Collectively, these two terms 
underwrite the resolution of uncertainty about hidden states (i.e., information gain) and 
outcomes (i.e., expected surprisal) in relation to prior beliefs. 
Intrinsic value is also known as intrinsic motivation in neurorobotics (Barto et al., 2013; 
Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007; Ryan and Deci, 1985), the value of information in economics 
(Howard, 1966), salience in the visual neurosciences and (rather confusingly) Bayesian 
surprise in the visual search literature (Itti and Baldi, 2009; Schwartenbeck et al., 2013; Sun et 
al., 2011). In terms of information theory, intrinsic value is mathematically equivalent to the 
 
11 Because the expected evidence bound cannot be less than zero, the expected free energy of a policy is always 
greater than the (negative) expected intrinsic value (i.e., log evidence) plus the intrinsic value (i.e., information 
gain). 
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expected mutual information between hidden states in the future and their consequences – 
consistent with the principles of minimum redundancy or maximum efficiency (Barlow, 1961; 
Barlow, 1974; Linsker, 1990). Finally, from a statistical perspective, maximising intrinsic 
value (i.e., salience and novelty) corresponds to optimal Bayesian design (Lindley, 1956) and 
machine learning derivatives, such as active learning (MacKay, 1992). On this view, active 
learning is driven by novelty; namely, the information gain afforded to beliefs about model 
parameters, given future states and their outcomes. Heuristically, this curiosity resolves 
uncertainty about “what would happen if I did that?” (Schmidhuber, 2010). Figure 1 illustrates 
the compass of expected free energy, in terms of its special cases, ranging from optimal 
Bayesian design through to Bayesian decision theory. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Active inference: This figure illustrates the various ways in which minimising expected free energy can be 
unpacked. The upper panel casts action and perception as the minimisation of variational and expected free energy, 
respectively. Crucially, active inference introduces beliefs over policies that enable a formal description of 
planning as inference (Attias, 2003; Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012; Kaplan and Friston, 2018). In brief, posterior 
beliefs about hidden states of the world, under plausible policies, are optimised by minimising a variational (free 
energy) bound on log evidence. These beliefs are then used to evaluate the expected free energy of allowable 
Belief propagation under active inference 
 
14 
 
policies, from which actions can be selected (Friston et al., 2017a). Crucially, expected free energy subsumes 
several special cases that predominate in psychology, machine learning and economics. These special cases are 
disclosed when one removes particular sources of uncertainty from the implicit optimisation problem. For 
example, if we ignore prior preferences, then the expected free energy reduces to information gain (Lindley, 1956; 
MacKay, 2003) or intrinsic motivation (Barto et al., 2013; Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007; Ryan and Deci, 1985). 
This is mathematically the same as expected Bayesian surprise and mutual information that underwrites salience 
in visual search (Itti and Baldi, 2009; Sun et al., 2011) and the organisation of our visual apparatus (Barlow, 1961; 
Barlow, 1974; Linsker, 1990; Optican and Richmond, 1987). If we now remove risk but reinstate prior 
preferences, one can effectively treat hidden and observed (sensory) states as isomorphic. This leads to risk 
sensitive policies in economics (Fleming and Sheu, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) or KL control in 
engineering (van den Broek et al., 2010). Here, minimising risk corresponds to aligning predicted outcomes to 
preferred outcomes. If we then remove intrinsic value, we are left with extrinsic value or expected utility in 
economics (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) that underwrites reinforcement learning and behavioural 
psychology (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Bayesian formulations of maximising expected utility under uncertainty is 
also known as Bayesian decision theory (Berger, 2011). Finally, if we just consider a completely unambiguous 
world with uninformative priors, expected free energy reduces to the negative entropy of posterior beliefs about 
the causes of data; in accord with the maximum entropy principle (Jaynes, 1957). The expressions for variational 
and expected free energy correspond to those described in the main text (omitting model parameters for clarity). 
They are arranged to illustrate the relationship between complexity and accuracy, which become risk and 
ambiguity, when considering the consequences of action. This means that risk-sensitive policy selection minimises 
expected complexity or computational cost (Sengupta and Friston, 2018). 
 
Sophisticated inference 
So far, we have considered generative models of policies; namely, a fixed number of ordered 
action sequences. These generative models can be regarded as placing priors over actions that 
stipulate a small number of allowable action sequences. In what follows, we consider more 
general models, in which the random variables are actions at each point in time; such that 
policies become a prior over transitions among action or control states. If we relax this prior, 
such that successive actions are conditionally independent, we can simplify belief updating – 
and implicit planning – at the expense of having to consider a potentially enormous number of 
policies.  
The simplification afforded by assuming actions are conditionally independent follows because 
both actions and states become Markovian. This means we can use belief propagation (Winn 
and Bishop, 2005; Yedidia et al., 2005) to update posterior beliefs about hidden states and 
actions, given each new observation. In other words, we no longer need to evaluate the posterior 
over hidden states in the past to evaluate a posterior over policies. Technically, this is because 
policies introduced a semi-Markovian aspect to belief updating, by inducing conditional 
dependencies between past and future hidden states. The upshot of this is that one can use 
posterior beliefs from the previous time step as empirical priors for hidden states and actions 
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at the subsequent time step. This is formally equivalent to the forward pass in the forwards-
backwards algorithm (Ghahramani and Jordan, 1997), where the empirical prior over hidden 
states depends upon the preceding (i.e., realised) action. Put simply, we are implementing a 
Bayesian filtering scheme in which observations are generated by action at each time step. 
Crucially, the next action is sampled from an empirical prior based upon (a free energy 
functional of) posterior beliefs about the current hidden state. 
Note that we do not need to evaluate a posterior over action, because action is realised before 
the next observation is generated. In other words, we can sample realised actions from an 
empirical prior over actions that inherits from the posterior over all previous states. This leads 
to a simple belief-propagation scheme for planning as inference that can be expressed as 
follows: 
( )
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Expected free energy of next action
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 (1.10) 
Here, ( | )Q s u   denotes an empirical prior – from the point of view of state estimation – or a 
predictive posterior – from the point of view of action selection – over hidden states, given 
realised actions u  . Similarly, ( )Q s  denotes the corresponding posterior, given subsequent 
outcomes. This scheme is exact because we have made no mean-field approximations of the 
sort required by variational message passing (Dauwels, 2007; Friston et al., 2017c; Parr et al., 
2019; Winn and Bishop, 2005). Furthermore, there are no conditional dependencies on policies, 
which have been replaced by realised actions. However, equation (1.10) only considers the 
next action. The question now arises: how many future actions should we consider? 
At this point the cost of the Markovian assumption arises: if we choose a policy horizon that is 
too far into the future, the number of policies could be enormous. In other words, we could 
effectively induce a deep tree search over all possible sequences of future actions that would 
be computationally prohibitive. However, we can now turn to sophisticated schemes to finesse 
the combinatorics. This rests upon the straightforward observation that if we propagate beliefs 
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and uncertainty into the future, we only need to evaluate policies or paths that have a nontrivial 
likelihood of being pursued. This selective search over plausible paths is constrained at two 
levels. First, by propagating probability distributions, we can restrict the search over future 
outcomes – for any given action at any point in the future – that have a non-trivial posterior 
probability (e.g., greater than 1/16). Similarly, we only need to evaluate those policies that are 
likely to be pursued; namely, those with an expected free energy that renders their prior 
probability nontrivial (e.g., greater than 1/16). 
This deep search involves evaluating all actions under all plausible outcomes, so that one can 
perform counterfactual belief updating at each point in time (given all plausible outcomes). 
However, it is not necessary to evaluate outcomes per se – it is sufficient to evaluate 
distributions over outcomes, conditioned upon plausible hidden states. This is a subtle but 
important aspect of finessing the combinatorics of belief propagation into the future – that rests 
upon having a generative model (that generates outcomes). 
Heuristically, one can imagine searching a tree with diverging branches at successive times in 
the future but terminating the search down any given branch when the prior probability of an 
action (and the predictive posterior probability of its subsequent outcome) reach a suitably 
small threshold (Keramati et al., 2016; Solway and Botvinick, 2015). To form a marginal 
empirical prior over the next action, one simply accumulates the average expected free energy 
from all the children of a given node in the tree recursively. A softmax function of this 
accumulated average then constitutes the empirical prior over the next action. Algorithmically, 
this can be expressed as follows – based on Appendix 6 (Friston et al., 2017a) – where u  
denotes action at t   (omitting novelty terms associated with model parameters for clarity): 
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 (1.11) 
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Posterior beliefs over hidden states and empirical priors over action are then recovered from 
the above recursion as follows, noting that one’s most recent action (u
t-1
)  and current outcome 
(o
t
)  are realised (i.e., known) variables: 
( ) ( | ) ( | )
( ) [ ( , )]
t t t t t
t t t
Q s P o s Q s u
Q u G o u

=
        (1.12) 
Equation (1.11) expresses the expected free energy of each potential next action (u
t
) as the 
risk and ambiguity of that action plus the average expected free energy of future beliefs, under 
counterfactual outcomes and actions (u
t +1
) . Readers familiar with the Bellman optimality 
principle (Bellman, 1952) may recognise a formal similarity between (1.11) and the Bellman 
equation because both inherit from the same recursive logic. The sophisticated inference 
scheme deals with functionals (functions of belief distributions over states), while the Bellman 
equation deals directly with functions of states. 
Figure 2 provides a schematic that casts this recursive formulation as a deep tree search. This 
search can be terminated at any depth or horizon. Later, we will rewrite this recursive scheme 
in terms of sufficient statistics to illustrate its simplicity. Having established the formal basis 
of sophisticated planning, in terms of belief propagation, we now turn to some illustrative 
examples to show how it works in practice. 
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FIGURE 2 
Deep policies searches. This schematic summarises the accumulation of expected free energy over 
paths or trajectories into the future. This can be construed as a deep tree search, where the tree branches 
over allowable actions at each point in time – and the likely outcomes consequent upon each action. 
The arrows between actions and outcomes have been drawn in the reverse direction (directed from the 
future) to depict the averaging of expected free energy over actions (green arrows) and subsequent 
averaging over the outcomes entailed by the preceding action (pink arrows). This dual averaging over 
actions (given outcomes) and outcomes (given actions) is depicted by the equations in the upper panel. 
Here, the green nodes of this tree correspond to outcomes, with one (realised) outcome at the current 
time (at the top). The pink nodes denote actions; here, just four. Note that the search terminates 
whenever an action is deemed unlikely – or an outcome is implausible. The panel on the lower right 
represents the conditional dependencies in the generative model as a probabilistic graphical model. The 
parameters of this model are shown on squares, whereas the variables are shown on circles. The arrows 
denote conditional dependencies. Filled circles are realised variables at the current time; namely, the 
preceding action and the subsequent outcome. 
 
Simulations 
In this section, we provide some simulations to compare sophisticated and unsophisticated 
schemes on the three-arm bandit task described in the introduction. Here, we will frame this 
paradigm in terms of a rat, foraging in a three arm T-maze, where the right and left upper arms 
are baited with rewards and punishments, while the bottom arm contains an instructional cue 
indicating whether the bait is likely to be on the right or left. In these examples, cue validity 
was 95%. The details of this setup have been described elsewhere (Friston et al., 2016; Friston 
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et al., 2017a). In brief, the generative model comprises a likelihood mapping between hidden 
states and outcomes – and probability transitions among states. Here, there are two outcome 
modalities: the first reports the experience of the rat in terms of its location (with distinct 
outcomes for the instructional cue location – right versus left). The second modality registered 
rewarding outcomes, with three levels (none, reward, and punishment – e.g., foot shock). There 
were two hidden factors: the rat’s location (with four possibilities) and the latent context (i.e., 
whether the rewarding arm was on the right or the left). With these hidden states and outcomes, 
we specify the generative model in terms of:  
• The sensory mapping A, which maps from the two hidden state factors (location and 
context) to each of the two sensory modalities (location and reward).  
• The transition matrices B, which govern how states at one time point map onto the next, 
given a particular action (u
t
) . The transitions among locations are action-dependent, with 
four actions (moving to one of the four locations), while the context did not change during 
any particular trial (i.e., there were no context transitions within trials). 
• The cost vectors C for each hidden state factor, which also specify the agent’s preferences 
for each outcome modality. The latter allows for an alternative formulation that we discuss 
below. 
• The priors over initial states, D.  
In the following simulations, the rat experienced 32 trials, each comprising two moves with 
three outcomes, including an initial outcome that located the rat at the start (i.e., centre) 
location. The rat encountered the first trial with ambiguous prior beliefs about the context, i.e., 
the reward was equally likely to be right or left. 
Given this parameterisation of the generative model, the expected free energy of an action, 
given outcomes, (1.11) can be expressed in terms of sufficient statistics of posterior beliefs and 
model parameters as follows12: 
 
12 We have suppressed any tensor notation here by assuming there is only one outcome modality and one hidden 
factor. In practice, this assumption can be guaranteed by working with the Kronecker tensor product of hidden 
factors. This ensures exact Bayesian inference, because conditional dependencies among hidden factors are 
evaluated. 
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Here, denotes a Hadamard (i.e., element-wise) product and the dot notation means 
To o  A A . The sufficient statistics are the parameters of the categorical distributions in 
(1.11), where model parameters are usually hyper-parameterised in terms of the concentration 
parameters of Dirichlet distributions (denoted by capital and small bold variables, 
respectively): 
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The equivalent scheme, when specifying preferences in terms of outcomes ln ( )P o=C  is: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Expected free energy of next action and subsequent actions
( , ) [ln ] ( , )u u u o uu o u o        + + + + + + +=  + +  + G o C s H u G oo    (1.15) 
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As noted above, it is usually more convenient to search over distributions over outcomes that 
are generated by (plausible) hidden states – as opposed to (plausible) outcomes per se. This 
approach produces a slightly simpler form for expected free energy: 
1 1 1 1 1
Next action and subsequent actions
( , ) [ln ( , ) ]u u u ou o u s      + + + + +=  + + + G s s C H G A u     (1.16) 
Finally, as intimated above, the recursive estimation of expected free energy from subsequent 
states can be terminated, when the probability of an action or outcome can be plausibly 
discounted. In the simulations here, searches over paths were terminated when the predictive 
probability fell below 1/16. 
The simulations were chosen to illustrate the fidelity of beliefs about action (i.e., what to do 
next) with and without a sophisticated update scheme; i.e., (1.10) and (1.11). We anticipated 
that sophisticated schemes would outperform unsophisticated schemes, in the sense that they 
would learn any contingencies more efficiently, via more confident action selection. This 
learning was elicited by baiting the left arm consistently, after a couple of trials – so that priors 
about the initial (latent context) state could be accumulated, in the form of posterior (Dirichlet) 
concentration parameters (d).  In these generative models, learning is straightforward and 
involves the accumulation of posterior concentration parameters (Friston et al., 2016). For 
example, to learn the likelihood mapping and initial hidden states, we have13: 
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In these sorts of simulation, the agent succumbs to the epistemic affordance of the instructional 
cues, until it learns that the reward is always on the left-hand side. At which point, the expected 
utility (or extrinsic value) of going directly to the baited arm exceeds the epistemic affordance 
(or intrinsic value) of soliciting the instructional cue. At this point, there is a switch from 
 
13 Note that in order to accumulate beliefs about the context from trial to trial, it is necessary to carry over posterior 
beliefs about context from one trial as prior beliefs for the next (in the form of Dirichlet concentration parameters). 
For consistency with earlier formulations of this paradigm, we carry over the beliefs about the initial state on the 
previous trial that are evaluated using a conventional backwards pass; namely, the normalised likelihood of any 
given initial state, given subsequent observations – and probability transitions based on realised action. 
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explorative to exploitative behaviour – the behavioural measure we used to compare 
sophisticated and unsophisticated schemes. 
 
Exploration and exploitation in a T-maze 
Figure 3 shows the results of three simulations. In these simulations, the rat performed 32 trials 
where each trial comprised two moves, starting from the central location. The prior preferences 
for reward and punishment outcomes were specified with the prior costs (C) of -2 and 2, 
respectively14. In these and subsequent simulations, actions were selected as the most likely 
(maximum a posteriori) action. Therefore, all subsequent simulations are deterministic 
realisations of (Bayes) optimal behaviour based upon expected free energy. The simulations in 
Figure 3 start with a sophisticated agent with a planning horizon of two (this corresponds to 
the depth of action sequences considered into the future). In other words, it accumulates the 
expected free energy for all plausible paths, until the end of each trial. This enables a confident 
and definitive epistemic policy selection that gives way to exploitation, when the rat realises 
the reward is always located in the left arm.  
If we compare this performance with that of an unsophisticated rat – who just looks one move 
ahead – we see a similar behaviour. However, there are two differences. First, the rat is less 
confident about its behaviour, because it does not evaluate the consequences of its actions in 
terms of belief updating. Although it finds the instructional cue more attractive – in virtue of 
its epistemic affordance – it is still partially compelled to remain at the central location, which 
ensures that it will avoid aversive outcomes. Because the unsophisticated agent underestimates 
the epistemic affordance of the instructional cue, it paradoxically performs better in terms of 
suspending its information foraging earlier – and switching to exploitative behaviour a few 
trials before the sophisticated agent (but see below).  
For completeness, we show the results of an unsophisticated agent, whose behaviour is 
predicated on Bayesian risk, i.e., with no epistemic value in play. As might be anticipated, this 
 
14 Because costs are specified in terms of self-information or surprisal, they have meaningful and quantitative 
units. For example, a differential cost of three natural units corresponds to a log odds ratio 1:20 and reflects a 
strong preference for one state what outcome over another. This is the same interpretation of Bayes factors in 
statistics: Kass, R.E., Raftery, A.E., 1995. Bayes Factors. Journal of the American Statistical Association 90, 773-
795. Here, the difference between reward and punishment was four natural units. 
Belief propagation under active inference 
 
23 
 
agent exposes itself to Bayesian risk – by foregoing a visit to the right or left arm – in a way 
that is precluded by agents who minimise expected free energy. Here, the starting and 
instructional cue locations are equally attractive. When the rat is lucky enough to select the 
lower arm, it knows what to do; however, it has no sense that this is the right kind of behaviour. 
After a sufficient number of trials, it realises that the reward is always on the left-hand side and 
starts to respond in an exploitative fashion, albeit with relatively low confidence. These results 
highlight the distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated agents who predicate their 
policy selection on expected free energy – and between unsophisticated agents using expected 
free energy with and without epistemic affordance. 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
Epistemic foraging in a T-maze. This figure shows the results of simulations based upon the T-maze 
paradigm described in the main text. The left panel shows the results of simulating 32 trials, where the 
rat started at the central location. Each trial comprises two moves. The insert on the upper left illustrates 
foraging for information by interrogating the instructional cue in the lower arm and then securing the 
reward in the left arm. The results in each of the three panels have the same format. The upper row 
illustrates the predictive distribution over actions (moves to the central location, the left, the right and 
lower arm, respectively). The darker the colour, the more likely the action. The cyan dots are the actions 
that were sampled and executed at each epoch, within each trial. The coloured dots above indicate the 
hidden context; namely, whether the left or right arm was baited. The middle panel shows the resulting 
performance, in terms of the expected utility or negative Bayesian risk. The coloured circles show the 
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final outcome (blue location 3 – right arm – and green location 2 – left arm). The lowest panel (on the 
left) shows the posterior beliefs about the hidden context (right versus left) based upon Dirichlet 
concentration parameters, accumulated over trials. The left panel of results shows confident epistemic 
behaviour with a planning horizon of two. As is typical in these kinds of simulations, the agent starts 
off by foraging for information and responding to the epistemic affordance of the instructional cue in 
the lower arm. However, because the reward is always encountered in the left arm (after the first couple 
of trials), the rat loses interest in the instructional cue – as it becomes more confident about where the 
reward is located. This experience-dependent loss of epistemic affordance leads to a switch from 
exploratory to exploitative behaviour; here at trial 16. A similar kind of behaviour is shown in the upper 
right panels; however, here, the planning horizon was reduced to one. In other words, the rat only 
considered the expected free energy of one move ahead. The key difference here is a less confident (i.e., 
precise) belief distribution over early actions (highlighted by the red circles). Although the lower arm 
has the greatest posterior probability, there is a nontrivial probability that the rat thinks it should stay 
where it is. This mild ambiguity about what should be done, means that exploratory behaviour yields to 
exploitative behaviour slightly earlier, at trial 10. Finally, the lower right panels show the results when 
expected free energy is replaced by Bayesian risk. In other words, any epistemic affordance of the 
instructional cue is precluded. This renders the posterior probability of staying or moving to the lower 
arm the same. When, by chance, the instructional cue is encountered, exploitative behaviour follows; 
however, there are times when the rat simply stays at the central location and learns nothing about the 
prevailing context. Note, that in this example, there are costly trials, in which the rat fails to visit either 
baited arm. 
 
In the above simulations, the sophisticated agent persevered with its epistemic behaviour for 
longer than the unsophisticated agent. At first glance, this may seem to be a paradoxical result 
– if we were measuring performance in terms of Bayesian risk. However, this is not the case 
as illustrated in Figure 4. Here, we repeated the simulations above but with one small change: 
we made the epistemic cue mildly aversive, by giving it a cost of one. This has no effect on the 
sophisticated agent; other than slightly abbreviating the exploratory phase of activity. However, 
the unsophisticated agent has, understandably, been caught in a bind. The starting location is 
now marginally more preferable than the instructional cue – and it has no reason to leave the 
centre of the maze. While this ensures aversive outcomes are avoided, it also precludes 
epistemic foraging and subsequent exploitation. Heuristically, only the sophisticated agent can 
see past the short-term pain for the long-term gain. We will pursue this theme in the final 
simulations, where the agent’s planning horizon becomes non-trivial. 
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FIGURE 4 
This reproduces the results of the previous figure with a deep policy search (of horizon or depth 2). 
However, here, we have made the lower arm slightly aversive. This is no problem for the sophisticated 
agent who ‘sees through’ the short-term cost to visit the instructional cue as usual. Because this location 
is mildly aversive, the switch to exploitative behaviour is now slightly earlier (at trial 12). Contrast this 
behaviour with an unsophisticated agent that does not look beyond its next move. The resulting 
behaviour is shown in the lower panels. Unsurprisingly, the agent just stays at the starting position and 
learns nothing about its environment – and safely avoids all adverse outcomes at the expense of forgoing 
any rewards. 
 
Deep planning and navigation 
The simulations above show that a sophisticated belief-updating scheme enables more 
confident and nuanced policy selection – that translates into more efficient exploitative 
behaviour. To illustrate how this scheme scales up to deeper policy searches, we revisit a 
problem that has been previously addressed using a bespoke prior, based upon the graph 
Laplacian (Kaplan and Friston, 2018). This problem was previously framed in terms of 
navigation to a target location in a maze. Here, we forego any special priors to see if the 
sophisticated scheme could handle deep tree searches that underwrite paradoxical behaviours, 
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like moving away from a target to secure it later (c.f., the mountain car problem). Crucially, in 
this instance, there was no ambiguity about the hidden states. However, there was ambiguity 
or uncertainty about the likelihood mapping that determines whether a particular location 
should be occupied or not. In other words, this example uses a more conventional foraging 
setup; in which the rat has to learn about the structure of the maze while, at the same time, 
pursuing its prior preferences to reach a target location. Here, exploratory behaviour is driven 
by the intrinsic value or information gain afforded to beliefs about parameters of the likelihood 
model – as opposed to hidden states. Colloquially, one can think of this as epistemic affordance 
that is underwritten by novelty as opposed to salience (Barto et al., 2013; Parr and Friston, 
2019a; Schwartenbeck et al., 2019). Having said this, we anticipated that exactly the same kind 
of behaviour would arise and that the sophisticated scheme would be able to plan to learn – and 
then exploit what it has learned. 
In this paradigm, a rat has to navigate over the 88 grid maze, where each location may or may 
not deliver a mildly aversive stimulus (e.g., a foot-shock). Navigation is motivated by prior 
preferences to occupy a target location; here, the centre. In the simulations below, the rat starts 
at the entrance to the maze and has a prior preference for safe outcomes (cost of -1) and against 
aversive outcomes (cost of +1). Prior preferences for location depend on the distance from the 
current position to the target location. The generative model for this setup is simple: there was 
one hidden factor with 64 states corresponding to all possible locations. These hidden states 
generate safe or aversive (somatosensory) outcomes, depending upon the location. In addition, 
(exteroceptive) cues are generated that directly report grid location. The five allowable actions 
comprised one step in any direction or staying put. 
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FIGURE 5 
Navigation as inference. This figure reports the result of a simulated maze navigation. The upper 
panels illustrate the form of this maze, which comprises an 8 x 8 grid. Each location may or may not 
deliver a mildly aversive outcome (e.g., foot-shock). At the same time, the rat’s prior preference is to 
be near the centre of the maze. These prior preferences are shown in image format in the upper right 
panel, where the log prior preference is illustrated in pink, with white being the most preferred location. 
The lower three panels record the trajectory or path taken by a rat from the starting location on the lower 
left. The three panels show the (deterministic) solutions for a planning horizon of one, three and four). 
With horizons of less than four, the rat gets stuck on the other side of an aversive barrier that is closest 
to the central (i.e., target) location. This is because any move away from this location – with a small 
excursion – has a smaller expected free energy than staying put. However, if the policy search is 
sufficiently deep (i.e., a planning horizon greater than three) then the rat can effectively imagine what 
would happen if it pressed deeper into the future; enabling long-term gains to supervene over short-
term losses. This results in the rat inferring and pursuing the shortest path to the target location; even 
though it occasionally moves away from the centre. In these simulations, the rat knew the locations of 
the aversive outcomes and was motivated by minimising Bayesian risk. 
 
Figure 5 shows the results of typical simulations, when increasing the planning horizon from 
one through to four. The key thing to observe here is that there is a critical horizon, which 
enables our subject to elude local minima of expected free energy as it pursues its goal. In these 
simulations, our subject was equipped with full knowledge of the aversive locations and simply 
planned a route to its target location. However, relatively unsophisticated agents get stuck on 
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the other side of aversive barriers that are closest to the target location. In other words, they 
remain in locations in which the expected free energy of leaving is always greater than staying 
put (Cohen et al., 2007). This can happen when the planning horizon is insufficient to enable 
the rat to contemplate distal (and potentially preferable) outcomes (as seen in the lower left and 
middle panels of Figure 5). However, with a planning horizon of four (or more), these local 
minima are vitiated, and the rat easily plans – and executes – the shortest path to the target. In 
these simulations, the total number of moves was eight, which is sufficient to reach the target 
via the shortest path. This sort of behaviour is reminiscent of the prospective planning required 
to solve things like the mountain car problem. In other words, the path of least expected free 
energy can often involve excursions through state (and belief) space that point away from the 
ultimate goal. 
Above, we characterised the degree of sophistication in terms of planning as inference. In this 
setting, there was no ambiguity about outcomes that would license an explanation in terms of 
epistemic affordance or salience – of the sort that motivated behaviour in the T-maze examples 
of the preceding section. However, we can reintroduce epistemics by introducing uncertainty 
about the locations that deliver aversive outcomes. Exploration now becomes driven by 
curiosity about the parameters of the likelihood mapping: see (1.9). One can illustrate the 
minimisation of expected free energy in terms of curiosity and novelty (Barto et al., 2013; 
Schmidhuber, 2006) by simulating a rat who has never been exposed to the maze previously. 
This was implemented by setting the prior (Dirichlet) parameters of the likelihood mapping 
between hidden states and somatosensory outcomes to a small value (i.e., 1/64). In terms of 
sufficient statistics, the expected free energy is now supplemented with a novelty term based 
upon posterior expectations about the likelihood mapping (Friston et al., 2017b): 
1 1
Next action Novelty Subsequent actions
1 11
02
( , ) [ln ] ( , )
( )
u u u u o uu o u o         − −
− −
=  + + −  + 
= −
G s s C H o Ws u G o
W a a
    (1.18) 
In addition, we removed preferences for a particular location in order to study purely 
exploratory behaviour. The results of the ensuing simulation are shown in Figure 6. In this 
example, the rat was allowed to make 64 consecutive moves, while updating the Dirichlet 
parameters after every move. The upper panels of Figure 6 show the resulting trajectory. The 
key thing to observe here is that nearly every location has been explored. This rests upon a 
trajectory in which previously visited locations lose their novelty or epistemic affordance; 
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thereby promoting policies that take the rat into uncharted territory. This kind of exploratory 
behaviour disappears if we replace expected free energy with Bayesian risk. In this setting, 
after the first move, the rat returns to its original location and just sits there for 64 trials (see 
the lower panels of Figure 6). 
 
FIGURE 6 
Exploration and novelty. This figure reports the results of a simulation in the same maze as in the 
previous figure. However, here, we removed prior knowledge about which locations should be avoided 
– and prior preferences for being near the centre. This means that the only incentives for movement are 
purely epistemic in nature; namely, curiosity or the novelty of finding out “what would happen if I did 
that”. This produces a trajectory of moves that explore the locations, building up a picture of where 
aversive (foot-shock) stimuli are elicited and where they are not. The key aspect of this trajectory is that 
it avoids revisiting previously explored locations – to provide a nearly optimal coverage of the 
exploration space. The number of moves was 64 (with an updating of the posterior beliefs about 
likelihood parameters after each move). This means that, in principle, the rat could have visited every 
location. Indeed, nearly every location has been visited – as shown on the upper right, in terms of the 
final likelihood of receiving an aversive stimulus at each location. The lower panels show the same 
results but after replacing expected free energy (that includes the novelty term) with Bayesian risk (that 
does not). Unsurprisingly, the Bayesian risk agent has no imperative to move, because it has no 
preferences about its location and, after the first move, realises it is in a safe location. In other words, 
after the first move, it returns to the starting location and remains there for the remainder of available 
trials. As such, it learns nothing about the mapping between location and sensory outcomes. 
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Finally, to simulate curiosity under a task set, we reinstated prior preferences about location. 
In this simulation, the rat has to resolve the dual imperative to satisfy its curiosity, while – at 
the same time – realise preferences for being at the centre of the maze. In other words, it has to 
contextualise its goal seeking behaviour in relation to what it knows about how to realise those 
goals. Figure 7 shows the results of a simulation in which the rat was given five exposures to 
the maze, each comprising eight moves with a planning horizon of four. Within four exposures, 
it has learned what it needs to learn – about the aversive locations – to plan the shortest path to 
its target location and execute that path successfully (dotted black line in the left panel of Figure 
7). In contrast to Figure 6, the exploration is now limited to preferred locations with precise 
likelihood mappings that are sufficient to encompass the shortest path (compare the left panels 
of Figure 6 and Figure 7).  
This completes our numerical analyses, in which we have looked at deep policies searches 
predicated on expected free energy, where expected free energy supplements Bayesian risk 
with epistemic affordance – either in terms of salience (resolving uncertainty about hidden 
states) or novelty (resolving uncertainty about hidden model parameters). 
 
 
FIGURE 7 
Exploration under a task set. This figure reproduces the same paradigm as in the previous figure but reinstating 
prior preferences about being near the centre of the maze (i.e., a task set). In this instance, the imperatives for 
action include both curiosity and pragmatic drives to realise prior preferences. The left panel shows a sequence of 
trajectories over five trials, where the rat was replaced at the initial location following eight moves. The right 
panel shows the final accumulated Dirichlet counts depicting the probability of an aversive outcomes at each 
location. This accumulated evidence – or familiarity with the environment – enables the rat to plan the shortest 
path to its target after just four exposures. This path is shown as the black dashed line in the left panel. Compare 
the likelihood mapping with the previous figure. Here, the agent restricted its exploration to those parts of the 
maze that encompass the path to its goal.   
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Conclusion 
This paper has described a recursive formulation of expected free energy that, effectively, 
instigates a deep tree search for planning as inference. The ensuing planning is sophisticated, 
in the sense that it entails beliefs about beliefs – in virtue of accumulating predictive posterior 
expectations of expected free energies down plausible paths. In other words, instead of just 
propagating beliefs about the consequences of successive actions, the scheme simulates belief 
updating in the future, based upon preceding beliefs about the consequences of action. This 
scheme was illustrated using a simple T-maze problem and a navigation problem that required 
a deeper search. 
In the introduction, we noted that active inference may be difficult to scale, although 
remarkable progress has been made in this direction recently using amortized inference and 
sampling. For example, (Ueltzhöffer, 2018) parameterized both the generative model and 
approximate posterior with function approximators – using evolutionary schemes to minimise 
variational free energy, when gradients were not available. Similarly, (Millidge, 2019) 
amortized perception and action by learning a parametrised approximation to expected free 
energy. (Catal et al., 2019) focused on learning prior preferences, using a learning-from-
example approach. (Tschantz et al., 2019) extended previous point-estimate models to include 
full distributions over parameters. This allowed them to apply active inference to continuous 
control problems (e.g., the mountain car problem, the inverted pendulum task and a challenging 
hopper task) and demonstrate an order of magnitude increase in sampling efficiency, relative 
to a strong model-free baseline (Lillicrap et al., 2015). Please see (Tschantz et al., 2019) for a 
full discussion – and a useful deconstruction of active inference, in relation to things like 
model-based reinforcement learning; e.g., (Schrittwieser et al., 2019). 
Note that the navigation example is an instance of planning to learn. As such, it solves the kinds 
of problems for which reinforcement learning and its variants usually address. In other words, 
we were able to solve a learning problem from first (i.e. variational) principles, without 
recourse to backwards induction or other (belief-free) schemes like Q-learning, SARSA or 
successor representations; e.g., (Dayan, 1993; Gershman, 2017; Momennejad et al., 2017; 
Russek et al., 2017). This is potentially important because predicating an optimisation scheme 
on inference – as opposed to learning – endows it with a context sensitivity that eludes many 
learning algorithms (Daw et al., 2011). In other words, because there are probabilistic 
representations of time-sensitive hidden states (and implicit uncertainty about those states), 
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behaviour is motivated by resolving uncertainty about the context in which an agent is 
operating. This may be the kind of (Bayesian) mechanics that licenses the notion of competent 
schemes that can both ‘learn to plan’ and ‘plan to learn’. 
The current formulation of active inference does not call on sampling or matrix inversions – 
the Bayes optimal belief-updating deals with uncertainty in a deterministic fashion. 
Conceptually, this reflects the difference between the stochastic aspects of random dynamical 
systems and the deterministic behaviour of the accompanying density dynamics, which 
describe the probabilistic evolution of those systems (e.g., the Fokker Planck equation). 
Because active inference works in belief spaces, i.e., on statistical manifolds (Da Costa et al., 
2020b). There is no need for sampling or random searches – the optimal paths are, instead, 
evaluated by propagating beliefs or probability distributions into the future to find the path of 
least variational free energy (Friston, 2013).  
In the setting of deep policies searches, this approach has the practical advantage of terminating 
searches over particular paths, when they become implausible. For example, in the navigation 
example above, there were five actions and 64 hidden states leading to a large number of 
potential paths (1.0486·1010 for a planning horizon of four and 1.0737·1015 for a planning 
horizon of six). However, only a tiny fraction of these paths is actually evaluated – usually 
several hundred, which takes a few hundred milliseconds on a personal computer. Given 
reasonably precise beliefs about current states and state transitions, only a small number of 
paths are eligible for evaluation, which leads us to our final comment on the scalability of active 
inference. 
Limitations 
In one sense, we have addressed scaling through the computational efficiency afforded by 
belief propagation using the sophisticated scheme above. However, we have only illustrated 
this scheme on rather trivial problems. In principle, one can scale up the dimensionality of state 
spaces (and outcomes) with a degree of impunity. This follows from the fact that the number 
of plausible states (and transitions) can be substantially constrained, using the right kind of 
generative model – that leverages factorisations and sparsity. For example, the factorisation 
between hidden states and actions used above rests upon the implicit assumption that every 
action is allowed from every state. This is a strong assumption but perfectly apt for many 
generative models. 
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One could also call upon a related symmetry; namely, a hierarchical separation of temporal 
scales in deep models, where one Markov decision process is placed on top of another (Friston 
et al., 2017d; George and Hawkins, 2009; Hesp et al., 2019b; Rikhye et al., 2019). In these 
models, transitions at the higher level usually unfold at a slower time scale than the level below. 
This engenders semi-Markovian dependencies that can generate complicated and structured 
behaviours. In this setting, one could consider hidden states at higher levels that generate the 
initial and final states of the level below. Policy optimisation within each level – using a 
sophisticated scheme – could then realise the trajectory between the initial states (i.e., empirical 
priors over initial states) and final states (i.e., priors that determine the cost function and 
subsequent empirical priors over action).  
Finally, it should be noted that in many applications, the states and actions of real world 
processes are continuous, which presents a further scaling challenge for discrete state space 
models (Tschantz et al., 2019). However, it is possible to combine sophisticated (discrete) 
schemes with continuous models; provided one uses the appropriate message passing between 
the continuous and discrete levels. For example, (Friston et al., 2017c) used a Markov decision 
process to drive continuous eye movements. Indeed, it would be interesting to revisit 
simulations of saccadic searches using sophisticated inference, especially in the context of 
reading. 
 
Appendix 
This appendix considers two lemmas that underwrite expected free energy from two 
complementary perspectives. The first is based on a generative model that combines the 
principles of optimal Bayesian design (Lindley, 1956) and decision theory (Berger, 2011), 
while the second is based upon a principled account of self-organisation (Friston, 2019; Parr et 
al., 2020). Finally, we consider several corollaries that speak to the notions of active inference 
(Friston et al., 2015), empowerment (Klyubin et al., 2005), information bottlenecks (Tishby et 
al., 1999), self-organisation (Friston, 2013) and self-evidencing (Hohwy, 2016). In what 
follows, ( , , )Q o s    denotes a predictive distribution over future variables and policies, 
conditioned upon initial observations; while ( , , )P o s    denotes a generative model; i.e., a 
marginal distribution over final states and policies. For simplicity, we will omit model 
parameters and assume policies start from the current time point, allowing us to omit the 
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variational free energy from the generalised free energy (since observational evidence is the 
same for all policies). 
Objective: our objective is to establish a generalised free energy functional that can be 
minimised with respect to a posterior over policies; noting that this posterior is necessary to 
marginalise the joint posterior over hidden states and policies to infer hidden states. To comply 
with Bayesian decision theory, generalised free energy can be constructed to place an upper 
bound on Bayesian risk, which corresponds to the divergence between the predictive 
distribution over outcomes and prior preferences. In other words, Bayesian risk is the expected 
surprisal or negative log evidence. To comply with optimal Bayesian design, one can specify 
priors over policies that lead to states with a precise likelihood mapping to observable 
outcomes. 
Lemma: (Bayes optimality): generalised free energy15 is an upper bound on risk, under a 
generative model whose priors over policies lead to states with precise likelihoods: 
RiskGeneralised free energy
( , | )
Empirical prior
[ ( , )] [ln ( , ) ln ( , )] [ ( ) || ( )]
log ( ) [log ( | )]
Q KL
Q o s
F Q s Q s P o s D Q o P o
P P o s
 
 

  
 
 

= − 
=
   (1.19) 
Note that ( )P   is an empirical prior because it depends upon the predictive density that 
depends upon past observations. The priors over hidden states and outcomes can be regarded 
as a target distribution or prior preferences. 
Proof. By substituting the empirical prior (1.19) into the expression for free energy, we have 
(noting that policies and outcomes are conditionally independent, given hidden states): 
 
15 Equation (1.19) follows from  (1.1), when treating ( )F   and ( )E   as constants; i.e., ignoring past observations 
and empirical priors over policies. 
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Complexity (Policies)Expected risk (States)
Expected risk (States)
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These inequalities show that generalised free energy upper bounds the predictive divergence 
from the marginal likelihood over outcomes, i.e., model evidence. When this bound is 
minimised; (i) the complexity cost of policies is minimised – enforcing prior beliefs about 
policies; (ii) the predictive posterior over hidden states becomes the posterior under the 
generative model and (iii) policies and outcomes become independent. This independence 
follows by construction of the free energy functional and means that final outcomes do not 
depend upon initial conditions; implying a form of steady-state (please see below)  
Corollary (expected free energy): the free energy can now be minimised w.r.t. the posterior 
over policies, by expressing free energy in terms of expected free energy: 
( )
( , | )
Expected free energy
( , | )
Expected risk Exp
[ ( , )] [G( ) ln ( )]
( ) arg min [ ( , )] ln ( ) G( )
G( ) [ln ( | ) ln ( , )]
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Q
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Q F Q s Q
Q s P o s
D Q s P s P o s
 
 

   
    
  
   
 

= +
=  − =
= −
= −
ected ambiguity
    (1.21) 
This renders free energy F[ ( , )] [G( )] H[ ( )]QQ s Q  = −  an expected energy minus the 
entropy of the posterior over policies, in the usual way. Finally, we can express the expected 
free energy of a policy as a bound on information gain and Bayesian risk: 
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Expected evidence bound Expected log evidence
Expected information gain
( )  [ [ ( | , ) || ( | )]] [ln ( )]
 [ [ ( | , ) || ( | )]]
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Q
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Q
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Expected information gain Bayesian risk
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    (1.22) 
This inequality shows that the free energy of a policy upper bounds a mixture of its expected 
information gain (Lindley, 1956) and Bayesian risk (Berger, 2011), where Bayesian risk is 
expected log evidence  
Remarks: Here, policies are treated as random variables, which means that planning as 
inference (Attias, 2003; Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012) becomes belief updating under optimal 
Bayesian design priors (Lindley, 1956; MacKay, 1992). One might ask what licenses these 
priors above? Although they can be motivated in terms of information gain (1.22), there is a 
more straightforward motivation that arises as a steady-state solution. We now turn to this 
complementary perspective that inherits from the Bayesian mechanics described in (Friston, 
2019). Here, we are interested in situations when the predictive distribution attains its steady-
state or target distribution. 
Objective: We seek distributions over policies that afford steady-state solutions, i.e., when the 
final distribution does not depend upon initial observations. Such solutions ensure that, on 
average, stochastic policies lead to a steady-state or target distribution specified by the 
generative model. These solutions exist in virtue of conditional independencies, where the 
hidden states provide a Markov blanket (c.f., information bottleneck) that separates policies 
from outcomes. In other words, policies cause final states that cause outcomes. We will see 
below that there is a family of such solutions, where the Bayes optimality solution above is a 
special (canonical) case. In what follows, ( , , ) : ( , , | )Q o s P o s o     =  can be read as a 
posterior distribution, given initial conditions. 
Lemma (nonequilibrium steady-state): When the surprisal of policies corresponds to a Gibbs 
free energy G( , )  , the final distribution attains steady-state: 
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   (1.23) 
Here, 0   characterises steady-state in terms of the relative precision of policies and final 
outcomes, given final states. The generative model stipulates steady-state, in the sense that 
distribution over final states (and outcomes) does not depend upon initial observations. Here, 
the generative and predictive distributions simply express the conditional independence 
between policies and final outcomes, given final states. Note that when 1 = , Gibbs free 
energy becomes expected free energy. 
Proof: rearranging the expressions in (1.23) and substituting into the KL divergence between 
the predictive and generative distributions gives: 
 (1.24) 
This solution describes a particular kind of steady-state, where policies lead to (steady) states 
with more or less precise likelihoods, depending upon the value of    
Remarks: At steady-state, hidden states (and outcomes) ‘forget’ about initial observations, 
placing constraints on the distribution over policies that can be expressed in terms of a Gibbs 
free energy. In the limiting case that 0 =  we obtain a simple steady state where: 
( , | )
( | )
G( ,0) ln [ ( | ) || ( )]
( )
Q o s KL
Q s
D Q s P s
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
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 
= = 
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   (1.25) 
Belief propagation under active inference 
 
38 
 
This solution corresponds to a standard stochastic control, variously known as KL control or 
risk-sensitive control (van den Broek et al., 2010). In other words, one picks policies that 
minimise the divergence between the predictive and target distribution. More generally (i.e., 
0  ), policies are more likely when they lead to states with a precise likelihood mapping. 
One perspective – on the distinction between simple and general steady-states – is in terms of 
conditional uncertainty about policies. For example, simple (i.e., 0 = ) steady-states preclude 
uncertainty about which policy led to a final state. This would be appropriate for describing 
classical systems (that follow a unique path of least action), where it would be possible to infer 
which policy had been pursued, given the initial and final outcomes. Conversely, in general 
steady-state systems (e.g., mice and men), simply knowing that ‘you are here’ does not tell me 
‘how you got here’, even if I knew where you were this morning. Put another way, there are 
lots of paths or policies open to systems that attain a general steady state. 
The treatment in (Friston, 2019) effectively turns the steady-state lemma on its head by 
assuming the steady-state in  (1.23) is stipulatively true – and then characterises the ensuing 
self-organisation in terms of Bayes optimal policies. In active inference, we are interested in a 
certain class of systems that self-organise to general steady-states; namely, those that move 
through a large number of probabilistic configurations from their initial state to their final 
(steady) state. In terms of information geometry, this means that the information distance 
between any initial and the final (steady) state is large. In the current setting, we could replace 
information distance (Crooks, 2007; Kim, 2018) by information gain (Lindley, 1956; MacKay, 
1992; Still and Precup, 2012). That is, we are interested in systems that attain steady-state (i.e., 
target distributions) with policies associated with a large information gain16. Although not 
pursued here, general steady states with precise likelihood mappings have precise Fisher 
information matrices and information geometries that distinguish general forms of self-
organisation from simple forms (Amari, 1998; Ay, 2015; Caticha, 2015; Ikeda et al., 2004; 
Kim, 2018). This perspective can be unpacked in terms of information theory with the 
following corollaries, which speak to active inference, empowerment, information bottlenecks, 
self-organisation, and self-evidencing. 
 
16Note that a divergence such as information gain is not a measure of distance. The information distance (a.k.a. 
information length) can be regarded as the accumulated divergences along a path on a statistical manifold from 
the initial location to the final location. 
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Corollary (active inference): If a system attains a general steady-state, then by the Bayes 
optimality lemma, it will appear to behave in a Bayes optimal fashion – both in terms of optimal 
Bayesian design (i.e., exploration) and Bayesian decision theory (i.e., exploitation). Crucially, 
the loss function defining Bayesian risk is the negative log evidence for the generative model 
entailed by an agent. In short, systems (i.e., agents) that attain general steady-states will look 
as if they are responding to epistemic affordances (Parr and Friston, 2017)  
Corollary (empowerment): At its simplest, empowerment (Klyubin et al., 2005) underwrites 
exploration (i.e., intrinsic motivation) by exploring as many states in the future as possible – 
and thereby keeping options open. This exploratory imperative is evinced clearly if we 
generalise free energy to include  : 
Risk Empowerment
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This expresses the free energy of the predictive distribution over final states and policies in 
terms of risk and empowerment. Minimising free energy with respect to policies therefore 
maximises empowerment; namely, the mutual information between policies and their final 
states, given initial observations. The epistemic aspect of empowerment can be seen by 
expressing it in terms of expected ambiguity: 
EntropyEmpowerment Expected ambiguity
( ; | ) ( | ) [ ln ( | )]QI S o H o P o s    =  −      (1.27) 
On this reading, empowerment corresponds to minimising expected ambiguity, while 
maximising the entropy of policies. In other words, keeping (policy) options open by avoiding 
situations from which there is only one ‘escape route’. Note that empowerment is a special case 
of active inference, when we can ignore risk (i.e., when all policies are equally risky)  
Corollary (information bottleneck): the information bottleneck method and related 
formulations (Bialek et al., 2001; Still et al., 2012; Tishby et al., 1999; Tishby and Polani, 
2010) can be seen as generalisations of rate distortion theory. On this view, we can consider 
hidden states as an information bottleneck (c.f., Markov blanket) that plays the role of a 
compressed representation of past outcomes that best predict future outcomes. Here, we can 
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regard the policies as mapping between initial and final observations, via hidden states. The 
information bottleneck method provides an objective function that can be minimised with 
respect to the distribution over policies. This (information bottleneck) objective function can 
be expressed in terms of the expected Gibbs energy as follows: 
 ( | ) ( , , | )
Information bottleneck Bayesian risk
( | , ) ( )
( , ) ln ln ln ( )
( ) ( | )
( ; | ) ( ; ) [ ln ( )]
P o P o s o
P
P s o P o
G P o
P s P o s
I O S I S O P o
 
 
  
  
   

   
  
 


 
= + − 
 
= − −
 (1.28) 
This means the average Gibbs energy of a policy, over initial observations, combines the 
information bottleneck objective function and Bayesian risk. Minimising the first term of the 
objective function (i.e., the mutual information between initial outcomes and hidden states) 
plays the role of compression, while maximising the second (i.e., the mutual information 
between hidden states final and outcomes) ensures the information gain that characterises 
general steady-states. Indeed, when relative precision 1 = , it is straightforward to show that 
the information bottleneck is an upper bound on expected information gain: 
( , , | )
Information bottleneck
( | )
Expected information gain Expected evi
( ; | ) ( ; ) [ln ( | ) ln ( | )]
[ [ ( | , ) || ( | )] [ ( | , ) || ( | )]
P o s o
P o KL KL
I O S I S O Q s P s o
D Q s o Q s D Q s o P s o
 

      
       
 
  

− = −
= − +
dence bound
( | )
Expected information gain
]
[ [ ( | , ) || ( | )]] ( ; | , )P o KLD Q s o Q s I S O O         − = −
           (1.29) 
Because the information bottleneck objective function is an average over initial observations it 
cannot be used directly for online (active) planning as inference; however, it can be used to 
learn fixed outcome-action policies (Hafez-Kolahi and Kasaei, 2019; Tishby and Zaslavsky, 
2015). Note that the information bottleneck method is a special case of active inference, when 
we can ignore Bayesian risk (i.e., when all policies are equally risky)  
Corollary: (self-organisation): the average of expected free energy over policies can be 
decomposed into risk and conditional entropy: 
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Expected free energy
Expected risk Expected ambiguity
Ex s
( )
pected ri k
[G( )] [ln ( | ) ln ( , )]
[ [ ( | ) || ( )] [ ln ( | )]
[ [ ( | ) || ( )]
Q
Q
L
Q
QKL
Q K
Q s P o s
D Q s P s Q o s
D Q s P s
   
   
 
 


= −
= + −
=
Conditional entropy
H( | , ) 0O S o  + 
   (1.30) 
This decomposition means that if the expected free energy of policies is – on average – small, 
the predictive distribution over hidden states will converge to the prior or preferred distribution, 
while uncertainty about consequent outcomes will be small. In the limit, the predictive 
distribution over hidden states becomes the prior distribution, with no uncertainty about 
outcomes. This can be read as the limiting case of self-organisation to prior beliefs  
Corollary: (self-evidencing): the average of expected free energy over policies furnishes an 
upper bound on the (negative) expected log evidence of outcomes and the mutual information 
between these outcomes and their causes (i.e., hidden states): 
Expected free energy
( , )
Expected information gain Expected log ev d
( )
(
i ence
, )
)
(
[G( )] [ln ( | ) ln ( , )]
[ [ ( | , ) || ( | )]] [ln ( )]
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Q o KL
Q o
Q
Q o
Q s P o s
D Q s o Q s P o
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    

 
 
= −
= − −
+
Expected evidence bound
Mutual information Expected log evidence
( )
[ ( | , ) || ( | )]]
( , | , ) [ln ( )]Q o
KLD Q s o P s o
I S O o P o

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 
 

 −  −
  (1.31) 
This decomposition means that if the expected free energy of policies is – on average – small, 
the expected log evidence and the mutual information between predicted states and the 
outcomes they generate will be large. In the limit, expected log evidence is maximised, with 
no uncertainty about outcomes, given hidden states. This can be read as the limiting case of 
self-evidencing with unambiguous outcomes  
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FIGURE 8 
Active inference and other schemes. This schematic summarises the various imperatives implied by 
minimising a free energy functional of posterior beliefs about policies, ensuing states and subsequent 
outcomes. The information diagrams in the upper panels represent the entropy of the three variables, 
where intersections correspond to shared information or mutual information. A conditional entropy 
corresponds to an area that precludes the variable upon which the entropy is conditioned. Note that there 
is no overlap between policies and outcomes that is outside hidden states. This is because hidden states 
form a Markov blanket (i.e., information bottleneck) between policies and outcomes. Two 
complementary formulations of minimising expected free energy are shown on the right (in terms of 
risk and ambiguity) and left (in terms of information gain and entropy), respectively. One can see that 
both will tend to increase the overlap or mutual information between hidden states and outputs, while 
minimising entropy or Bayesian risk. In these diagrams, we have assumed steady-state, such that risk 
becomes the mutual information between policies and hidden states. For simplicity, we have omitted 
dependencies on initial observations. The various schemes or formulations considered in the text are 
shown at the bottom. These demonstrate that Bayesian decision theory (i.e., KL control and Bayesian 
risk) and optimal Bayesian design figure as complementary imperatives. 
 
It can sometimes be difficult to see the relationships between the various conditional entropy 
and mutual information terms that constitute the free energy functional. Figure 8 tries to clarify 
these relationships using information diagrams. This schematic highlights the complementary 
decompositions of expected free energy in terms of risk and ambiguity – and information gain 
and entropy. These decompositions are summarised in terms of the imperative to minimise 
various segments of the information diagrams. Figure 1 then highlights the particular 
components that figure in special cases, such as an optimal Bayesian decisions and design. 
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Software note 
Although the generative model changes from application to application, the belief updates 
described in this paper are generic and can be implemented using standard routines (here 
spm_MDP_VB_XX.m). These routines are available as Matlab code in the SPM academic 
software: http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/. The simulations in this paper can be reproduced 
(and customised) via a graphical user interface by typing >> DEM and selecting the appropriate 
(T-maze or Navigation) demo. 
Acknowledgements 
KJF was funded by the Wellcome Trust (Ref: 088130/Z/09/Z). LD is supported by the Fonds 
National de la Recherche, Luxembourg (Project code: 13568875). CH was funded by a 
Research Talent Grant (no. 406.18.535) of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific 
Research (NWO). 
 
Disclosure statement 
The authors have no disclosures or conflict of interest. 
 
References 
Amari, S., 1998. Natural gradient works efficiently in learning. Neural Computation 10, 251-276. 
Åström, K.J., 1965. Optimal control of Markov processes with incomplete state information. Journal of 
Mathematical Analysis and Applications 10, 174-205. 
Attias, H., 2003. Planning by Probabilistic Inference, Proc. of the 9th Int. Workshop on Artificial Intelligence 
and Statistics. 
Ay, N., 2015. Information Geometry on Complexity and Stochastic Interaction. Entropy 17, 2432. 
Barlow, H., 1961. Possible principles underlying the transformations of sensory messages, in: Rosenblith, W. 
(Ed.), Sensory Communication. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 217-234. 
Barlow, H.B., 1974. Inductive inference, coding, perception, and language. Perception 3, 123-134. 
Barto, A., Mirolli, M., Baldassarre, G., 2013. Novelty or Surprise? Frontiers in Psychology 4. 
Beal, M.J., 2003. Variational Algorithms for Approximate Bayesian Inference. PhD. Thesis, University College 
London. 
Bellman, R., 1952. On the Theory of Dynamic Programming. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 38, 716-719. 
Berger, J.O., 2011. Statistical decision theory and Bayesian analysis. Springer, New York; London. 
Bialek, W., Nemenman, I., Tishby, N., 2001. Predictability, complexity, and learning. Neural Computat. 13, 
2409-2463. 
Botvinick, M., Toussaint, M., 2012. Planning as inference. Trends Cogn Sci. 16, 485-488. 
Belief propagation under active inference 
 
44 
 
Camerer, C.F., Ho, T.-H., Chong, J.-K., 2004. A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games*. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 119, 861-898. 
Catal, O., Nauta, J., Verbelen, T., Simoens, P., Dhoedt, B., 2019. Bayesian Policy Selection Using Active 
Inference. Workshop on “Structure & Priors in Reinforcement Learning" at ICLR 2019 : Proceedings. 2019. 
Caticha, A., 2015. The basics of information geometry. AIP Conference Proceedings 1641, 15-26. 
Cohen, J.D., McClure, S.M., Yu, A.J., 2007. Should I stay or should I go? How the human brain manages the 
trade-off between exploitation and exploration. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 362, 933-942. 
Costa-Gomes, M., Crawford, V.P., Broseta, B., 2001. Cognition and behavior in normal-form games: An 
experimental study. Econometrica 69, 1193-1235. 
Crooks, G.E., 2007. Measuring thermodynamic length. Phys Rev Lett 99, 100602. 
Da Costa, L., Parr, T., Sajid, N., Veselic, S., Neacsu, V., Friston, K., 2020a. Active inference on discrete state-
spaces: a synthesis. arXiv arXiv:2001.07203. 
Da Costa, L., Parr, T., Sengupta, B., Friston, K., 2020b. Natural selection finds natural gradient. arXiv 
arXiv:2001.08028. 
Dauwels, J., 2007. On Variational Message Passing on Factor Graphs, 2007 IEEE International Symposium on 
Information Theory, pp. 2546-2550. 
Daw, N.D., Gershman, S.J., Seymour, B., Dayan, P., Dolan, R.J., 2011. Model-based influences on humans' 
choices and striatal prediction errors. Neuron 69, 1204-1215. 
Dayan, P., 1993. Improving generalization for temporal difference learning: The successor representation. 
Neural Comput. 5, 613-624. 
Dayan, P., Hinton, G.E., Neal, R.M., Zemel, R.S., 1995. The Helmholtz machine. Neural Comput 7, 889-904. 
Devaine, M., Hollard, G., Daunizeau, J., 2014. Theory of Mind: Did Evolution Fool Us? PLOS ONE 9, e87619. 
Doya, K., 1999. What are the computations of the cerebellum, the basal ganglia and the cerebral cortex? Neural 
Netw 12, 961-974. 
Duff, M.O., 2002. Optimal learning: computational procedures for Bayes-adaptive Markov decision processes. 
Fleming, W.H., Sheu, S.J., 2002. Risk-sensitive control and an optimal investment model II. Ann. Appl. Probab. 
12, 730-767. 
Friston, K., 2013. Life as we know it. J R Soc Interface 10, 20130475. 
Friston, K., 2019. A free energy principle for a particular physics, eprint arXiv:1906.10184. 
Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., O'Doherty, J., Pezzulo, G., 2016. Active inference and 
learning. Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews 68, 862-879. 
Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., Pezzulo, G., 2017a. Active Inference: A Process 
Theory. Neural Comput 29, 1-49. 
Friston, K., Rigoli, F., Ognibene, D., Mathys, C., Fitzgerald, T., Pezzulo, G., 2015. Active inference and 
epistemic value. Cogn Neurosci 6, 187-214. 
Friston, K.J., Lin, M., Frith, C.D., Pezzulo, G., Hobson, J.A., Ondobaka, S., 2017b. Active Inference, Curiosity 
and Insight. Neural Comput 29, 2633-2683. 
Friston, K.J., Parr, T., de Vries, B., 2017c. The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference. 
Network neuroscience (Cambridge, Mass.) 1, 381-414. 
Friston, K.J., Rosch, R., Parr, T., Price, C., Bowman, H., 2017d. Deep temporal models and active inference. 
Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews 77, 388-402. 
George, D., Hawkins, J., 2009. Towards a mathematical theory of cortical micro-circuits. PLoS Comput Biol 5, 
e1000532. 
Gershman, S.J., 2017. Predicting the Past, Remembering the Future. Curr Opin Behav Sci 17, 7-13. 
Ghahramani, Z., Jordan, M.I., 1997. Factorial hidden Markov models. Machine Learning 29, 245-273. 
Ghavamzadeh, M., Mannor, S., Pineau, J., Tamar, A., 2016. Bayesian Reinforcement Learning: A Survey. arXiv 
arXiv:1609.04436. 
Hafez-Kolahi, H., Kasaei, S., 2019. Information Bottleneck and its Applications in Deep Learning. CoRR 
abs/1904.03743. 
Hesp, C., Ramstead, M., Constant, A., Badcockyy, P., Kirchhoff, M., Friston, K., 2019a. A Multi-scale View of 
the Emergent Complexity of Life: A Free-Energy Proposal. Evolution, Development and Complexity, 195-227. 
Hesp, C., Smith, R., Parr, T., Allen, M., Friston, K., Ramstead, M., 2019b. Deeply felt affect: the emergence of 
valence in deep active inference. PsyArXiv. 
Hohwy, J., 2016. The Self-Evidencing Brain. Noûs 50, 259-285. 
Howard, R., 1966. Information Value Theory. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Science and Cybernetics SSC-2, 
22-26. 
Ikeda, S., Tanaka, T., Amari, S.-i., 2004. Stochastic reasoning, free energy, and information geometry. Neural 
Computation 16, 1779-1810. 
Itti, L., Baldi, P., 2009. Bayesian Surprise Attracts Human Attention. Vision Res. 49, 1295-1306. 
Jaynes, E.T., 1957. Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics. Physical Review Series II 106, 620–630. 
Belief propagation under active inference 
 
45 
 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47, 
263-291. 
Kaplan, R., Friston, K.J., 2018. Planning and navigation as active inference. Biological cybernetics 112, 323-
343. 
Kass, R.E., Raftery, A.E., 1995. Bayes Factors. Journal of the American Statistical Association 90, 773-795. 
Kauder, E., 1953. Genesis of the Marginal Utility Theory: From Aristotle to the End of the Eighteenth Century. 
The Economic Journal 63, 638-650. 
Keramati, M., Smittenaar, P., Dolan, R.J., Dayan, P., 2016. Adaptive integration of habits into depth-limited 
planning defines a habitual-goal-directed spectrum. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 
Kim, E.-j., 2018. Investigating Information Geometry in Classical and Quantum Systems through Information 
Length. Entropy 20, 574. 
Klyubin, A.S., Polani, D., Nehaniv, C.L., 2005. Empowerment: A Universal Agent-Centric Measure of Control. 
In Proc. CEC 2005. IEEE 1, 128-135. 
Lee, J.J., Keramati, M., 2017. Flexibility to contingency changes distinguishes habitual and goal-directed 
strategies in humans. PLoS Comput Biol 13, e1005753. 
Lillicrap, T.P., Hunt, J.J., Pritzel, A., Heess, N., Erez, T., Tassa, Y., Silver, D., Wierstra, D., 2015. Continuous 
control with deep reinforcement learning. arXiv e-prints, arXiv:1509.02971. 
Lindley, D.V., 1956. On a Measure of the Information Provided by an Experiment. Ann. Math. Statist. 27, 986-
1005. 
Linsker, R., 1990. Perceptual neural organization: some approaches based on network models and information 
theory. Annu Rev Neurosci. 13, 257-281. 
MacKay, D.J.C., 1992. Information-Based Objective Functions for Active Data Selection. Neural Computation 
4, 590-604. 
MacKay, D.J.C., 2003. Information Theory, Inference and Learning Algorithms. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Millidge, B., 2019. Deep Active Inference as Variational Policy Gradients. arXiv e-prints, arXiv:1907.03876. 
Momennejad, I., Russek, E.M., Cheong, J.H., Botvinick, M.M., Daw, N.D., Gershman, S.J., 2017. The 
successor representation in human reinforcement learning. Nature Human Behaviour 1, 680-692. 
Optican, L., Richmond, B.J., 1987. Temporal encoding of two-dimensional patterns by single units in primate 
inferior cortex. II Information theoretic analysis. J Neurophysiol. 57, 132-146. 
Oudeyer, P.-Y., Kaplan, F., 2007. What is intrinsic motivation? a typology of computational approaches. 
Frontiers in Neurorobotics 1, 6. 
Parr, T., Da Costa, L., Friston, K., 2020. Markov blankets, information geometry and stochastic 
thermodynamics. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 378. 
Parr, T., Friston, K.J., 2017. Working memory, attention, and salience in active inference. Scientific reports 7, 
14678. 
Parr, T., Friston, K.J., 2019a. Attention or salience? Current Opinion in Psychology 29, 1-5. 
Parr, T., Friston, K.J., 2019b. Generalised free energy and active inference. Biological cybernetics 113, 495-513. 
Parr, T., Markovic, D., Kiebel, S.J., Friston, K.J., 2019. Neuronal message passing using Mean-field, Bethe, and 
Marginal approximations. Scientific reports 9, 1889. 
Ramnani, N., 2014. Automatic and controlled processing in the corticocerebellar system. Prog Brain Res 210, 
255-285. 
Rikhye, R.V., Guntupalli, J.S., Gothoskar, N., Lázaro-Gredilla, M., George, D., 2019. Memorize-Generalize: An 
online algorithm for learning higher-order sequential structure with cloned Hidden Markov Models. bioRxiv, 
764456. 
Ross, S., Chaib-draa, B., Pineau, J., 2008. Bayes-adaptive POMDPs. Advances in Neural Information 
Processing Systems 20. 
Russek, E.M., Momennejad, I., Botvinick, M.M., Gershman, S.J., Daw, N.D., 2017. Predictive representations 
can link model-based reinforcement learning to model-free mechanisms. PLoS Comput Biol 13, e1005768. 
Ryan, R., Deci, E., 1985. Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. Plenum, New York. 
Schmidhuber, J., 1991. Curious model-building control systems. Proceedings of the IEEE. 
Schmidhuber, J., 2006. Developmental robotics, optimal artificial curiosity, creativity, music, and the fine arts. 
Connection Science 18, 173-187. 
Schmidhuber, J., 2010. Formal Theory of Creativity, Fun, and Intrinsic Motivation (1990-2010). Ieee 
Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development 2, 230-247. 
Schrittwieser, J., Antonoglou, I., Hubert, T., Simonyan, K., Sifre, L., Schmitt, S., Guez, A., Lockhart, E., 
Hassabis, D., T., G., Lillicrap, T.P., Silver, D., 2019. Mastering Atari, Go, Chess and Shogi by Planning with a 
Learned Model. arXiv e-prints, arXiv:1911.08265. 
Schwartenbeck, P., Fitzgerald, T., Dolan, R.J., Friston, K., 2013. Exploration, novelty, surprise, and free energy 
minimization. Front Psychol 4, 710. 
Belief propagation under active inference 
 
46 
 
Schwartenbeck, P., Passecker, J., Hauser, T.U., FitzGerald, T.H.B., Kronbichler, M., Friston, K.J., 2019. 
Computational mechanisms of curiosity and goal-directed exploration. eLife 8, e41703. 
Sengupta, B., Friston, K., 2018. How Robust are Deep Neural Networks? arXiv arXiv:1804.11313. 
Solway, A., Botvinick, M.M., 2015. Evidence integration in model-based tree search. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 
112, 11708-11713. 
Still, S., Precup, D., 2012. An information-theoretic approach to curiosity-driven reinforcement learning. Theory 
in biosciences = Theorie in den Biowissenschaften 131, 139-148. 
Still, S., Sivak, D.A., Bell, A.J., Crooks, G.E., 2012. Thermodynamics of prediction. Phys Rev Lett 109, 
120604. 
Suh, S., Chae, D.H., Kang, H.G., Choi, S., 2016. Echo-State Conditional Variational Autoencoder for Anomaly 
Detection, 2016 International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, pp. 1015-1022. 
Sun, Y., Gomez, F., Schmidhuber, J., 2011. Planning to Be Surprised: Optimal Bayesian Exploration in 
Dynamic Environments, in: Schmidhuber, J., Thórisson, K.R., Looks, M. (Eds.), Artificial General Intelligence: 
4th International Conference, AGI 2011, Mountain View, CA, USA, August 3-6, 2011. Proceedings. Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 41-51. 
Sutton, R.S., Barto, A.G., 1981. Toward a modern theory of adaptive networks: expectation and prediction. 
Psychol Rev. 88, 135-170. 
Sutton, R.S., Barto, A.G., 1998. Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Tishby, N., Pereira, F.C., Bialek, W., 1999. The Information Bottleneck method. The 37th annual Allerton 
Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, 368–377. 
Tishby, N., Polani, D., 2010. Information Theory of Decisions and Actions, in: Cutsuridis, V., Hussain, A., and 
Taylor, J. (Eds.), Perception-reason-action cycle: Models, algorithms and systems. Springer, Berlin. 
Tishby, N., Zaslavsky, N., 2015. Deep learning and the information bottleneck principle, pp. 1-5. 
Todorov, E., 2008. General duality between optimal control and estimation, IEEE Conference on Decision and 
Control. 
Toussaint, M., Storkey, A., 2006. Probabilistic inference for solving discrete and continuous state Markov 
Decision Processes, Proc. of the 23nd Int. Conf. on Machine Learning, pp. 945–952. 
Tribus, M., 1961. Thermodynamics and Thermostatics: An Introduction to Energy, Information and States of 
Matter, with Engineering Applications. D. Van Nostrand Company Inc, New York, USA. 
Tschantz, A., Baltieri, M., Seth, A.K., Buckley, C.L., 2019. Scaling active inference. arXiv e-prints, 
arXiv:1911.10601. 
Ueltzhöffer, K., 2018. Deep active inference. Biological cybernetics 112, 547-573. 
van den Broek, J.L., Wiegerinck, W.A.J.J., Kappen, H.J., 2010. Risk-sensitive path integral control. UAI 6, 1–8. 
Von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O., 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton. 
Winn, J., Bishop, C.M., 2005. Variational message passing. Journal of Machine Learning Research 6, 661-694. 
Yedidia, J.S., Freeman, W.T., Weiss, Y., 2005. Constructing free energy approximations and generalised belief 
propagation algorithms. Ieee T Inform Theory 51. 
 
